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The	influence	of	system	design-related	factors	on	
the	safety	performance	of	metro	drivers	
	
Aleksandrs	Rjabovs1	and	Roberto	Palacin1	
	
Abstract	
Although	it	is	accepted	that	system	design	affects	train	driver	performance,	the	literature	related	to	this	
phenomenon	-	in	relation	to	urban	railways	and	metro	systems	in	particular	-	is	scarce.	Metro	systems	
differ	 significantly	 from	 mainline	 railways,	 being	 closed	 systems,	 with	 shorter	 headways,	 a	 greater	
number	of	stations	and	more	signals	encountered.	This	paper	aims	to	investigate	the	effects	of	design-
related	 performance	 shaping	 factors	 on	 metro	 driver	 performance,	 by	 analysing	 historical	 incident	
records	for	the	2011-13	period	on	the	Tyne	&	Wear	(T&W)	Metro	(UK).	Bivariate	statistical	analysis	has	
been	 used,	 to	 assess	 the	 potential	 inter-dependency	 of	 the	 performance	 shaping	 factors	 and	 other	
common	 causal	 factors,	 for	 various	 driver-related	 incident	 types.	 In	 addition	 to	 category	 A	 Signals	
Passed	at	Danger	incidents	(SPaDs),	station	overruns,	and	incidents	associated	with	station	procedures	
have	 also	 been	 assessed.	 The	 results	 show	 the	 significant	 importance	 of	 the	 location	 (design)	 based	
performance	 shaping	 factors	 in	 incident	 propagation	mechanisms	 in	 the	Metro.	 The	 two	 years	 under	
investigation	display	 increased	consistency	between	driver-related	 incidents	and	locations,	rather	than	
time	of	day,	or	season.	In	addition,	the	highest	correlation	between	incidents	has	been	found	in	terms	of	
locations.	Deviations	from	a	standardised	T&W	Metro	station	design	were	found	to	associate	with	either	
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an	increase	or	decrease	in	incident	rates,	depending	on	whether	additional	complexity	or	simplicity	was	
introduced.	 Although	 the	 features	 of	 metro	 systems	 suggest	 improved	 route	 knowledge	 and	 system	
familiarity	among	drivers,	the	results	show	that	this	can	actually	lead	to	an	unsatisfactory	safety-related	
performance	during	non-routine	operations,	e.g.	engineering	works,	or	driving	in	sidings.		
Keywords	
Urban	rail,	metro	systems,	safety,	system	design,	human	factors,	performance	shaping	factors,	human	
performance.	
Introduction	
Railway	systems	are	one	of	the	safest	modes	of	transport,	but	they	are	not	risk-free;	incidents	do	occur,	
in	a	range	of	magnitude,	and	sometimes	with	severe	consequences.	Despite	being	the	European	safety	
leader	 in	 railway	 industry,	 United	 Kingdom	 still	 sees	 hundreds	 of	 major	 passenger	 and	 workforce	
incidents	annually	(1).	Even	the	incidents	receiving	the	most	of	attention	since	the	beginning	of	the	21st	
century,	 signals	 passed	 at	 danger	 (SPaDs),	 still	 occur	 in	 numbers.	 According	 to	 (1)	 2014/15	 saw	 299	
SPaDs	 in	 the	 UK,	 including	 Tyne	 &	 Wear	 Metro	 system.	 Looking	 closer	 into	 the	 T&W	 Metro’s	
contribution	 to	 this	 statistics	 it	 can	be	seen	that	 its	proportion	of	 such	 incidents	 is	 significantly	higher	
than	the	proportion	of	the	passenger	journeys	in	the	UK	(approximately	4%	and	2.3%	respectively).	Of	
course,	this	situation	is	a	result	of	the	metrics	not	accounting	for	the	number	of	encountered	signals	and	
stations	stops	but	there	is	also	a	significant	gap	in	the	research	of	metro	systems.	Furthermore,	due	to	
the	number	of	station	stops	in	T&W	Metro	platform-train	interface	(PTI)	incidents	have	additional	risks	
associated	with	those	but	research	in	this	area	is	scarce.		
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Despite	 the	 technological	 advances	 of	modern	 systems,	 a	 typical	 railway	 still	 depends	 on	 the	 safety-
related	 performance	 of	 front	 line	 staff,	 especially	 drivers.	 	 Egea	 et	 al	 (2)	 found	 out	 that	 that	
approximately	80%	of	the	risk	in	the	railway	industry	can	be	attributed	to	front	line	staff,	whereas	most	
investment	is	streamed	into	the	technical	domain.	Human	Factors	(HF)	is	considered	a	suitable	approach	
to	address	all	aspects	of	safety,	in	safety-critical	industries	and	systems	(3).	The	increasing	relevance	of	
this	discipline	 is	evidenced	by	the	 increased	 involvement	of	 	human	factor	specialists	 	 in	the	design	of	
railway	systems	(4).	
Understanding	performance	shaping	factors	(PSFs)	can	help	create	safety-critical	systems	that	include	a	
human	operator	as	an	asset,	 rather	 than	a	 risk	 carrier.	 	Blackman,	Gertman	 (5)	describe	a	PSF	as	 “an	
aspect	 of	 the	 human’s	 individual	 characteristics,	 environment,	 organization,	 or	 task	 that	 specifically	
decrements	or	improves	human	performance”.	In	other	words,	PSFs	are	factors	that	have	an	effect	on	
the	 likelihood	 of	 human	 error.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 characteristics	 of	 using	 PSFs,	 is	 the	
recognition	 that	 human	 error	 is	 caused	 by	 a	 mix	 of	 different	 factors,	 thus	 acknowledging	 inter-
dependence	 (6).	 Progress	 in	 this	 research	 area	will	 potentially	 provide	 a	means	 to	 estimate	 a	 holistic	
response	to	any	design	alterations	in	the	system.		Previous	research	has	highlighted	the	importance	of	
system	 design-related	 factors	 to	 driver	 performance,	 as	 well	 as	 recognising	 that	 the	 operation	 of	
railways	includes	a	variety	of	human	factors	(7).	
This	paper	explores	the	influence	of	system	design-related	aspects	on	safety	performance	and	incident	
propagation	in	metro	systems,	from	both	the	HF	and	PSFs	perspectives,	applied	to	the	particular	case	of	
the	 Tyne	 &	Wear	Metro	 system	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (UK),	 using	 a	 bivariate	 statistical	 analysis	 of	
driver-related	incidents	between	2011	and	2013.		
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This	paper	presents	a	comprehensive	assessment	of	the	rail	human	factors	current	body	of	knowledge,	
as	 related	 to	 driver	 performance,	 followed	 by	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 design	 and	 operational	
characteristics	of	 the	T&W	Metro.	 Further	 sections	of	 the	paper	 introduce	 the	 research	methodology	
used,	 prior	 to	 presenting	 the	 results.	 Finally,	 these	 results	 are	 discussed	 and	 summarised	 in	 the	
conclusions.		
Rail	human	factors	
Despite	 the	advancement	of	 rail	human	 factors,	 there	 is	no	holistic	understanding	of	 the	 influence	of	
design-related	 PSFs	 on	 train	 driver	 performance.	 	 Existing	 research	 appears	 to	 be	 fragmented	 and	 is	
usually	 focused	on	 a	 single	 design	 aspect	 of	 a	 railway	 system.	 Several	 studies	 have	 looked	 at	 various	
parts	 of	 the	 railway	 system	design,	 rather	 than	 the	whole.	 For	 instance,	 the	 effects	 of	 low	 frequency	
noise	 in	 the	 cab	environment,	 inducing	 stress,	 fatigue,	depression	and	errors	of	 judgement,	has	been	
studied	 (8-11).	 The	 inter-dependency	 of	 tilt	 angle	 in	 tilting	 trains,	 and	 various	 anthropometric	
parameters	of	passengers	in	motion	sickness	propagation,	have	been	reported	by	Beard	and	Griffin	(12).	
Similarly,	 the	 relationship	 between	 user-centred	 cab	 component	 design,	 and	 driver	 workload	 and	
performance,	 has	 been	 explored	 by	 Hitchcock,	 Morris	 (13),	 Sumpor,	 Tos	 (14)	 and	 Van	 Der	 Weide,	
Frieling	(15).	Research	on	driver-machine	interaction	and	cab-signalling	has	been	conducted	with	a	focus	
on	driver	workload	and	 situational	 awareness	 (16-18).	 Signal	 sighting,	 and	 infrastructure	design,	have	
been	explored	from	the	human	factors	perspective	(19-22).	The	UK’s	Network	Rail	has	produced	internal	
policies	 to	 increase	 the	 integration	 of	 human	 factors	 into	 areas	 such	 as	 signalling	 design,	 human-
machine	 interaction,	 and	 others	 (23).	 The	 phenomenon	 of	 Signal	 Passed	 at	 Danger	 has	 been	 studied	
from	the	human	factors	perspective,	where	research	has	attempted	to	analyse	and	understand	patterns	
of	SPaD	incident	propagation	(24).	In	addition,	various	tools	have	been	created	for	accident	investigators,	
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to	help	determine	causal	 factors	 in	SPaDs	(25).	For	 instance,	the	UK’s	Rail	Safety	and	Standards	Board	
(RSSB)	 released	 a	 guide	 for	 the	 industry	 to	 support	 the	 understanding	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 the	 rail	
environment	 (26).	 A	 significant	 part	 of	 this	 guide	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 design	 of	 the	 immediate	 physical	
environment	 of	 the	 driver,	 including	 equipment	 and	 workplace	 design.	 It	 is	 acknowledged	 by	 the	
industry	 that	 successful	 system	 design	 can	 mitigate	 adverse	 environmental	 effects	 that	 significantly	
undermine	driver	 performance	 (27).	 Concentrating	on	human	 factors	 early	 in	 the	design	 stages	 helps	
eliminate	a		substantial	amount	of		risk,	by	reducing	the	number	of	human/system-related	clashes	(4).		
To	the	authors’	knowledge	there	is	no	specific	literature	available	focusing	on	metro	systems	from	the	
HF	and	PSF	perspectives.	Metro	systems	differ	 from	mainline	 railways	 in	ways	 that	might	 significantly	
change	incident	propagation	processes.	A	typical	metro	is	a	closed	system	that	is	smaller	than	mainline	
railway	systems.	The	variability	of	infrastructure,	rolling	stock	and	routes	is	also	significantly	reduced	in	
metro	systems.	Therefore,	metro	drivers	generally	 follow	identical	routes,	 in	 identical	rolling	stock,	on	
every	shift,	which	enhances	route	knowledge.	According	to	Naweed	(28),	route	knowledge	is	one	of	the	
most	 important	 driver	 skills,	 as	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 moving	 authority	 is	 often	 hidden	 from	 a	
driver’s	view.	Furthermore,	in	terms	of	training,	the	smaller	variability	in	encountered	scenarios	means	
faster	and	more	thorough	route	learning	(28).	In	addition,	urban	railways	are	high	capacity	systems	with	
short	 headways	 and	 shorter	 distances	 between	 stations.	 Consequently,	 metro	 drivers	 not	 only	
encounter	 more	 station	 stops,	 but	 also	 more	 signals.	 This,	 together	 with	 the	 use	 of	 highly	 effective	
brakes	combined	with	Automatic	Train	Protection	(ATP),	creates	a	risk	profile	which	differs	from	that	of	
mainline	railways.		
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The	Tyne	&	Wear	Metro	system	
The	Tyne	&	Wear	Metro	is	located	in	the	Tyne	&	Wear	conurbation	that	connects	Newcastle	upon	Tyne,	
Gateshead,	South	Tyneside,	North	Tyneside	and	Sunderland.	It	first	opened	in	1980	and	mostly	adapted	
existing	heavy	rail	infrastructure.	Today	the	system	spans	more	than	78	km	and	has	60	stations.	A	map	
of	 the	Metro	 can	be	 seen	 in	 figure	 1.	 The	 fleet	 consists	 of	 45	 two-car	 train	 sets.	 The	Metro	uses	 the	
original	class	994	rolling	stock,	which	is	currently	undergoing	its	¾	life	refurbishment.	The	cab	layout	is	
similar	to	the	original,	albeit	with	some	improvements	and	additions,	such	as	a	modernised	driver	seat	
and	advisory	system.	The	system	has	two	routes;	the	South	Gosforth	to	Pelaw	section	of	the	network	is	
considered	 the	“core”	of	 the	system,	as	both	 routes	pass	 through	 it,	and	 thus	 it	has	 the	highest	daily	
throughput	of	trains.	
The	majority	 of	 the	 stations	 in	 the	 T&W	Metro	 system	 are	 located	 overground.	 There	 are	 only	 eight	
underground	 stations	 in	 the	 network	 (St	 James,	 Monument,	 Manors,	 Jesmond,	 Haymarket,	 Central,	
Gateshead,	Sunderland).	However,	the	Metro’s	own	classification	counts	built-over	(subsurface)	stations,	
such	as	Regent	Centre,	as	underground	stations.	Using	the	Metro’s	own	classification	method,	thirteen	
stations	in	the	system	can	be	considered	underground	(the	previous	nine	plus	North	Shields,	Four	Lane	
Ends,	Regent	Centre,	Heworth).	Most	of	the	stations	have	two	platforms	with	a	length	suitable	for	two-
car	train	sets.	The	underground	stations,	the	“legacy”	stations	adapted	from	the	older	heavy	rail	system,	
and	some	other	stations,	e.g.	Pelaw,	have	longer	platforms.	There	are	twelve	line	and	service	terminus	
stations	in	the	Metro.	Line	terminuses	(Airport,	St	James,	South	Shields	and	South	Hylton)	have	either	a	
single	platform,	or	a	 layout	allowing	trains	to	arrive	at	any	of	the	two	available	platforms.	The	service	
terminuses	are	used	for	short	services	and	have	turn-back	facilities	at	a	station,	or	in	sidings.		
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The	majority	of	the	stations	fall	into	one	of	the	three	types	of	standard	designs	used	in	the	Metro	(figure	
2).	 Type	 1	 stations	 are	 overground	 stations	 and	 some	 subsurface	 stations.	 Type	 2	 stations	 are	 only	
overground	 stations,	whereas	 type	 3	 designs	 can	 be	 seen	 only	 at	 the	Newcastle	 and	 Sunderland	 city	
centre	 underground	 stations.	 All	 of	 these	 design	 types	 include	 driver	 only	 operation	 (DOO)	 dispatch	
equipment	 (a	mirror	 or	 a	monitor),	 platforms,	 and	 a	 running	 signal.	 Instead	 of	 the	 stopping	 position	
markers,	Type	3	stations	include	a	small	sign	on	a	wall	next	to	the	monitors	to	advise	drivers	of	the	best	
stopping	point.	Despite	a	high	level	of	standardisation,	some	of	the	stations	deviate	from	these	designs.	
For	example,	Tynemouth	would	be	considered	Type	1,	but	the	running	signal	is	on	the	opposite	side	of	
the	 track,	 whereas	 Cullercoats	 (also	 Type	 1)	 has	 no	 running	 signal	 at	 all.	 Another	 design	 aspect	 that	
tends	to	change	from	station	to	station,	is	the	point	at	which	passengers	enter	onto	the	platform.		
Figure	1.	Map	of	the	Tyne	&	Wear	Metro.	
Rjabovs	and	Palacin	
Figure	2.	Three	main	layouts	of	T&W	Metro	stations.	From	left	to	right:	Type	1,	Type	2	and	Type	3.	
The	Tyne	&	Wear	Metro	operates	on	its	own	infrastructure,	as	well	as	some	sections	using	track	shared	
with	Network	Rail	infrastructure;	thus	there	is	a	variety	of	signalling	used.	Most	of	the	system	has	simple	
two-aspect	 signalling,	 with	 occasional	 fixed	 distants	 and	 three-aspect	 signals.	 However,	 the	 Pelaw	 to	
Sunderland	 route	 uses	 Network	 Rail	 infrastructure	 and	 consequently	 utilises	 standard	mainline	 four-
aspect	signalling,	with	yellow	and	double	yellow	signals.	The	Pelaw	–	Sunderland	route	section	is	shared	
with	 both	 passenger	 and	 freight	 mainline	 trains,	 which	 operate	 at	 various	 speeds.	 The	 Gateshead	
Stadium	–	Pelaw	section	runs	parallel	to	the	Network	Rail	infrastructure,	with	Metro	drivers	able	to	see	
mainline	 tracks	 and	 signals.	 As	 of	May	 2015,	 signals	 using	 LED	 technology	were	 installed	 only	 at	 the	
depot	section.	Metro	drivers	do	not	have	benefit	of	the	Automatic	Warning	System	(AWS),	or	the	Train	
Protection	and	Warning	System	(TPWS),	available	to	mainline	train	drivers	at	the	shared	route.	A	fixed	
block	 command	&	 control	 system	 is	 used	 in	 the	 T&W	Metro.	 	 The	 Automatic	 Train	 Protection	 (ATP)	
system	 controls	 overspeeding	 and	 Signal	 Passed	 at	 Danger	 (SPaD)	 at	 certain	 locations	 only.	 The	 ATP	
system	 used	 is	 the	 Indusi	 system,	 which	 is	 a	 version	 of	 the	 German	 mainline	 railway	 warning	 and	
supervision	system	Induktives	Sicherungssystem.		
More	information	on	the	T&W	Metro	can	be	found	in	(29-31).		
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Methodology	
This	research	uses	a	methodology	based	on	a	bivariate	statistical	analysis	of	historical	 incident	data	 in	
the	T&W	Metro,	combined	with	an	observation	and	interview	approach,	to	explore	incident	propagation	
and	draw	conclusions	about	the	influence	of	design	aspects,	from	the	HF	and	PSF	perspectives.		
An	 in-depth	 examination	of	 statistical	 trends	 allows	 for	 the	uncovering	 of	 potential	 causal	 factors	 for	
driver-related	 incidents,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 system	 design-related	 PSFs.	 Exploring	 correlations	 between	
different	incident	types	has	been	chosen,	to	provide	a	better	understanding	of	PSF	inter-dependency,	as	
well	as	the	causal	mechanisms	of	some	incidents.		
Input	data	
The	raw	data	used	 in	this	research	were	provided	by	the	Tyne	&	Wear	Metro	operator.	1282	 incident	
reports	 from	 the	 2011/12	 and	 2012/13	 operating	 years	 were	made	 available.	 Each	 operating	 year	 is	
divided	into	13,	four-week	long	periods,	and	Table	1	shows	the	dates	for	each	period	of	2012/13.	
Table	1	Dates	of	the	13	operating	periods	of	2012/13		
Period	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	
Dates	 1	Apr	-29	Apr	
30	Apr	–	27	M
ay	
28	M
ay	–	24	Jun	
25	Jun	–	22	Jul	
23	Jul	–	19	Aug	
20		Aug	–	16	Sep	
17	Sep	–	14	O
ct	
15	O
ct	–	11	N
ov	
12	N
ov	–	9	Dec	
10	Dec	–	6	Jan	
7	Jan	–	3	Feb	
4	Feb	–	3	M
ar	
4	M
ar	–	31	M
ar	
	
The	data	are	based	on	 the	entries	contained	 in	 the	 incident	 reporting	 system.	Each	 incident	 is	 logged	
with	a	description,	date,	 time	and	 location,	 as	well	 as	being	allocated	an	 incident	 type.	 Such	 incident	
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types	are	grouped	into	larger	categories,	e.g.	“technical	domain	incidents”.	The	current	reporting	system	
is	 focused	 on	 operational	 incidents,	 especially	 technical	 faults.	 To	 perform	 the	 analysis,	 a	 new	
categorisation	of	the	incident	reports	was	required,	as	well	as	selecting	the	incident	types	to	be	retained.	
The	 categorisation,	 incident	 types	 used,	 and	 a	 brief	 description,	 are	 summarised	 in	 Table	 2.	 The	
categorisation	is	focused	on	driver-related	incidents,	but	some	of	the	technical	and	operational	domain	
incidents	are	also	retained.	 Incident	 reports	 that	did	not	 fit	any	of	 the	categories	were	excluded	 from	
the	study.	These	 included	mainly	 incidents	associated	with	pedestrians	or	vehicles	 trespassing	at	 level	
crossings,	which	were	assumed	not	to	be	associated	with	driver-related	incidents.		
Table	2.	Categorisation	of	the	incidents	used	in	the	study	and	their	descriptions	
Category	 Incident	type	 Description	
SPaD	
incidents	
Category	A	SPaD	 Category	 A	 Signal	 Passed	 at	 Danger	 (SPaD)	 occurs	 when	 a	
driver	 passes	 a	 signal	 displaying	 a	 stop	 aspect,	 without	
permission,	and	in	error	
Other	SPaDs	 Occurs	when	a	driver	passes	a	signal	displaying	a	stop	aspect,	
without	permission,	due	to	a	technical	fault	
Driver-
related	
incidents	
Overspeeding	 A	driver	exceeding	the	maximum	permitted	speed	of	a	line	
Failure	to	call	 A	driver	skipping	a	scheduled	stop,	without	permission	
Station	overrun	 Occurs	when	a	train	stops	beyond	the	platform	end	
Passenger	entrapment	 When	a	passenger	is	trapped	by	train	doors	
Wrong	 side	 doors	
activation	
A	driver	releases	the	wrong	set	of	doors	
Wrong	route	 A	 driver	 sets	 an	 incorrect	 train	 description	 that	 later	 affects	
passenger	information	and	route	setting.	It	is	also	possible	for	
the	 system	 to	 set	 points	 incorrectly.	 A	 driver	 who	 does	 not	
notice	the	issue,	and	takes	the	wrong	route,	is	still	at	fault.		
Technical	
domain	
incidents	
Signal	faults	 Technical	faults	associated	with	signalling	equipment	
Dispatch	 equipment	
faults	
Faults	 of	 Driver	 Only	 Operation	 (DOO)	 equipment,	 e.g.	
platform	mirrors	and	monitors	
Trainfault	ATP	 Technical	faults	of	train-borne	ATP	equipment	
Trackfault	ATP		 Technical	faults	of	lineside	ATP	equipment	
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Operational	
incidents	
Doors	obstruction	 Passengers	restricting	train	doors	from	closing	
Passenger	overcarried	 Passengers	being	 left	on	a	 train	when	a	 train	 is	 taken	out	of	
passenger	service	
Interface	
incidents	
LRA	incidents	 Low	Rail	Adhesion	(LRA)	conditions	that	did	not	lead	to	a	more	
serious	incident		
Foliage	 foul	 of	
infrastructure	
Incidents	 associated	 with	 the	 metro	 infrastructure	 at	 risk	
because	of	foliage	or	vegetation	
	
Three	separate	data	sets	based	on	time,	period,	and	location	were	created,	after	assessing	the	raw	data	
for	 consistency.	 This	 was	 required	 because	 incident	 causal	 mechanisms	 related	 to	 time,	 date	 and	
location	usually	fall	into	different	PSFs	groups.	Time	and	date-related	factors	are	associated	with	lighting	
and	 climatic	 conditions,	 patronage	 numbers	 and	 type,	 and	 seasonality.	 Furthermore,	 time-related	
factors	 also	 include	 individual	 driver	 factors,	 e.g.	 circadian	 rhythms.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 location-
related	 data	 set	 allows	 the	 study	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 system	 design	 features	 on	 metro	 driver	
performance,	on	specific	parts	of	the	network.		
For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 paper,	 driver-related	 incidents	 are	 understood	 as	 a	 combination	 of	 different	
factors	 affecting	 a	 driver.	 Such	 a	 combination	 of	 factors,	 happening	 in	 a	 certain	 order,	 is	 capable	 of	
bypassing	the	safety	mechanisms	of	a	system.		
Several	 incident	 types	had	a	 relatively	 small	 number	of	 cases,	 e.g.	 station	overrun,	 and	 failure	 to	 call	
incidents.	Locations	are	understood	as	an	approach	station.	Most	of	the	driver-related	incidents	in	this	
analysis	are	associated	with	station-based	duties,	thus	approach	station	information	is	considered	to	be	
sufficient.	All	timeframes	for	the	time-based	data	set	are	one	hour	long,	e.g.	07:00:00	to	07:59:59,	with	
the	 exception	 of	 01:00:00	 to	 04:59:59,	 when	 only	 maintenance	 vehicles	 and	 trains	 operate	 on	 the	
system.	The	Metro’s	passenger	flow	has	two	peaks:	between	7	and	9	am,	and	from	4	to	6	pm.	To	cope	
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with	 increased	passenger	numbers,	 the	number	of	 trains	 in	 the	network	 is	 at	 its	highest	during	 these	
peak	hours.		
The	preliminary	assessment	of	the	data	(32)	confirmed	the	importance	of	the	design-related	factors	in	
the	data	set.	The	assessment	looked	at	the	same	data	set	only	in	terms	of	descriptive	statistics,	in	order	
to	 obtain	 an	 overview	of	 the	Metro’s	 performance.	 Consistency	 of	 distributions	was	 checked	 only	 by	
plotting	polynomial	trend	lines	for	each	incident,	for	each	operating	year,	making	the	results	unreliable.	
Three	 incident	 peaks	 were	 discovered	 throughout	 the	 day,	 with	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 incidents	
occurring	between	12	and	2	pm.	 	 This	midday	peak	 led	 to	 several	 hypotheses	 about	 the	 influence	of	
certain	passenger	 types	at	 stations	 (the	elderly,	 children)	on	 incident	propagation,	with	only	a	 limited	
importance	 placed	 on	 the	 number	 of	 trains.	 Previous	 research	 suggests	 that	 the	 drastic	 change	 of	
environment	 at	 tunnel	 exit/entrance	 positively	 affects	 arousal	 levels	 (33),	 but	 the	 preliminary	
assessment	 did	 not	 find	 this	 to	 be	 the	 case	 for	Metro	 drivers,	 thus	 it	 requires	 further	 investigation.	
These	findings	generated	the	need	for	the	following	additional	indicators	and	data:		
1. Information	on	schools	and	hospitals	in	a	close	proximity	(500m)	to	a	station	was	collected,	to	
check	how	passenger	types	potentially	influence	incident	propagation.	
2. Data	on	the	hourly	number	of	trains	were	sourced	from	the	operator,	along	with	data	on	hourly	
driver	sign-ons.	Research	from	mainline	railways	suggests	that	train	drivers	have	an	increased	
risk	 of	 incident	 two	 hours	 after	 starting	 a	 shift,	 due	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 vibrations	 causing	 a	
decrease	in	arousal	levels	(33,	34).	
Finally,	 research	 from	the	automotive	 industry	 indicates	 that	a	 long	exposure	to	monotonous	physical	
environments	 decreases	 the	 arousal	 levels	 of	 car	 drivers	 (35).	 It	 was	 decided	 to	 check	 whether	 this	
applies	to	metro	drivers,	by	correlating	the	distances	between	stations	and	the	number	of	incidents.		
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Frequency	distribution	analysis	
Using	Microsoft	Office	 365	 software,	 the	 frequency	distribution	of	 each	 incident	 type	was	 studied,	 in	
order	to	identify	peak	times,	seasonally	inflated	incident	rates,	and	the	worst	performing	locations.	The	
current	approach	to	incident	analysis	often	focuses	only	on	statistics	from	the	entire	network,	whereas	
there	is	also	a	need	to	analyse	local	trends	and	risks	(36).	The	four	worst	performing	stations	for	certain	
driver-related	 incident	 types	were	selected,	 to	carry-out	 in-depth	examination	of	 the	potential	 factors	
inducing	 incident	 propagation	 at	 these	 specific	 locations.	 However,	 wrong	 route,	 and	 failure	 to	 call	
incidents	(as	defined	in	Table	2)	were	excluded	from	this	analysis,	due	to:	
• an	insignificant	number	of	‘failure	to	call’	incidents;	
• ‘wrong	route’	incidents	being	constrained	to	certain	stations	used	as	terminuses	in	the	Metro,	
due	to	the	nature	of	the	route	setting	tasks;	
For	category	A	SPaD	incidents	four	years	of	data	were	available	for	the	frequency	distribution	analysis.	
However,	the	bivariate	correlation	analysis	(associations)	is	performed	on	2011-13	data	for	this	incident	
type	
Bivariate	correlation	analysis	
A	bivariate	correlation	analysis	was	chosen	to	interrogate	the	data	in	order	to:	
• explore	the	existence	of	correlation	between	statistics,	for	two	operating	years,	for	each	driver-
related	incident	type,	in	order	to	check	for	consistency	in	year-on-year	distribution;		
• uncover	potential	associations	between	different	incident	types	in	all	the	data	sets;		
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• 	explore	possible	associations	between	the	additional	data	and	driver-related	incident	types	in	
the	respective	data	sets.	
Consistency	 in	 year-on-year	 distribution	 of	 a	 driver-related	 incident	 would	 suggest	 a	 clear-cut	
connection	 between	 the	 incident	 type	 and	 certain	 locations,	 times	 or	 periods.	 Associations	 found	
between	 the	 incident	 types	 indicate	 the	 potential	 presence	 of	 common	 causal	 factors.	 Exploring	
similarities	 in	 causal	 factors	has	 the	objective	of	enhancing	understanding	of	 the	 inter-dependency	of	
PSFs	 in	 metro	 systems.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 a	 correlation	 found	 does	 not	 always	 suggest	
causation.	 	 In	 many	 cases	 the	 relationships	 will	 be	 spurious	 correlations,	 meaning	 that	 there	 are	
common	factors	affecting	both	variables.		
The	 bivariate	 correlation	 analysis	 was	 carried	 out	 using	 IBM	 SPSS	 version	 22.	 	 All	 variables	 (incident	
types)	were	checked	for	normality	of	distributions	using	either	the	Shapiro-Wilk,	or	Smirnov-Kalmogorov	
test,	depending	on	sample	size	(37).	If	both	variables	were	found	to	be	normally	distributed,	the	Pearson	
Product	 Moment	 Correlation	 (PPMC)	 was	 used	 as	 the	 preferred	 correlation	 method.	 If	 one	 of	 the	
variables	was	not	normally	distributed,	then	the	Spearman	Rank	Correlation	(SRC)	technique	was	used.	
Results	
Under	 the	 proposed	 categorisation	 (table	 2)	 more	 than	 60%	 of	 the	 analysed	 incident	 reports	 were	
included	in	the	sample	for	the	bivariate	statistical	analyses.	Year	2012/13	has	approximately	two	times	
more	incidents	than	2011/12	but	most	of	this	increase	is	attributed	to	dispatch	equipment	faults	which	
only	started	to	be	reported	in	2012/13.	When	these	faults	are	excluded,	the	increase	is	still	significant	
with	43%	more	incidents	in	2012/13.	On	the	other	hand,	the	increase	in	driver-related	incidents	is	only	
1.5%.		
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Consistency	of	driver-related	incidents	
Table	3	below	shows	the	consistency	 in	distribution	of	driver-related	 incidents	over	the	two	operating	
years.	The	three	data	sets	are	presented	in	different	columns.	Most	of	the	driver-related	incidents	are	
localised	to	certain	parts	of	the	network.	Only	2	out	of	7	incident	types	are	consistent	in	terms	of	timing	
of	incidents.	Category	A	SPaDs	are	the	only	driver-related	incident	type	to	show	year-on-year	correlation	
in	 the	 context	 of	 periods.	 However,	 as	 the	 correlation	 coefficient	 is	 negative,	 the	 distribution	 of	 this	
incident	type	is	not	consistent.		
	
	
Table	3.	Correlation	of	driver-related	incidents,	year-on-year.		*	correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.05	level	
(2-tailed);	**correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2-tailed).	
Incident	type/Sample	type	 Date-based	 Time-based	 Location-based	
Category	A	SPaDs		 -0.565*	 -0.123	 0.283*	
Overspeeding	 -0.013	 0.244	 0.400**	
Failure	to	call	 0	 0	 0	
Station	overrun	 0.459	 0.221	 0.281*	
Passenger	entrapment	 -0.065	 0.601**	 0.353**	
Wrong	side	doors	activation	 -0.012	 0.427*	 0.543**	
Wrong	route	 -0.226	 0.395	 0.374**	
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Frequency	distributions	of	driver-related	incidents	
Table	 4	 summarises	 the	 results	 for	 the	 driver-related	 incidents,	 in	 the	 T&W	 Metro.	 It	 displays	 an	
overview	 of	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 driver-related	 incidents	 in	 each	 year.	 For	 the	 two	 years	 under	
investigation,	 overspeeding	 and	 wrong	 side	 doors	 incidents	 were	 the	 most	 encountered	 types,	 with	
26.3%	and	26.6%	of	all	incidents	studied.	The	incidents	associated	with	station	procedures	(wrong	side	
doors	activation,	passenger	entrapment)	account	for	46.6%	of	the	entire	data	set.		
In	the	context	of	seasonality,	Category	A	SPaDs	and	overspeeding	incidents	occur	most	often	at	either	
the	beginning	or	end	of	an	operating	year.	 	 Incident	types	known	to	demonstrate	distinct	seasonality,	
e.g.	 station	 overruns,	 were	 concentrated	 in	 the	 autumn	 periods.	 Finally,	 station-based	 incidents,	
including	wrong	route	setting,	tend	to	happen	in	the	second	half	of	an	operating	year.	There	are	three	
possible	incident	peak	times	in	the	T&W	Metro	–	around	the	morning	and	evening	peak	hours,	and	from	
12-2	pm.		
	
Table	4.	Proportion	of	driver-related	incidents	by	year	and	total.	
Incident	type	 2011/12	 2012/13	 For	2	years	
Category	A	SPaD	 6.3%	 10.4%	 8.4%	
Overspeeding	 27.5%	 25%	 26.3%	
Failure	to	call	 2.8%	 0%	 1.2%	
Station	overrun	 6.3%	 4.8%	 5.6%	
Passenger	entrapment	 13.4%	 26.4%	 20.0%	
Wrong	side	doors	activation	 36.7%	 16.7%	 26.6%	
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Wrong	route	 7.0%	 16.7%	 11.9%	
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%	
	
Associations	between	incident	types	
In	 total,	60	associations	were	 found	between	 incident	 types.	Half	of	 these	associations	were	 found	 in	
the	 location-based	 data	 set,	 whereas	 the	 time-based	 and	 date-based	 samples	 had	 11	 and	 19	
associations,	 respectively.	 For	 time-based	 data,	 dispatch	 equipment	 faults	 account	 for	 50%	 of	 the	
associations	 found.	 All	 of	 the	 associations	 have	medium	 to	 high	 strength.	 In	 the	 date-based	 sample,	
Category	 A	 SPaDs	 have	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 associations	 (four),	 with	 one	 negative	 correlation	
between	 dispatch	 equipment	 faults	 and	 passenger	 over-carried	 incidents,	 and	 the	 majority	 of	
associations	 have	 medium	 to	 low	 strength.	 The	 majority	 of	 location-based	 associations	 are	 low	 in	
strength,	with	five	significant	negative	correlation	coefficients	found,	mostly	with	passenger	entrapment	
incidents.	Category	A	SPaD	is	 involved	in	20%	of	the	correlations	found	in	the	location-based	data	set.	
Table	5	below	provides	an	overview	of	the	associations	found	for	driver-related	incidents	only,	together	
with	 summaries	 of	 the	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 such	 incidents.	 The	 rationale	 behind	 the	 data	
summarised	includes	the	following	aspects:	
• ‘Failure	to	call’	incidents	happened	at	only	three	stations,	between	2011	and	2013;	
• Only	three	stations	were	selected	for	‘wrong	route’	incidents,	as	these	stations	account	for	
55.9%	of	all	incidents	of	this	type,	with	no	other	station	having	more	than	6%	of	such	incidents.	
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Table	5.	Summary	of	the	results.	*	correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.05	level	(2-tailed);	**correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2-tailed).	
	 Peaks	 Associations	(correlation	coefficient)	
Incident	type	 Peak	period(s)	 Peak	time(s)	 By	period	 By	time	 By	location	
Category	A	
SPaD	
1-4,	12	 4-5	pm;	
8-10	am	
None	 Station	overrun	(.498*);	
Passenger	entrapment	(.574**);	
Wrong	side	doors	(.601**);	
Trainfault	ATP	(.524*);	
Overspeed	(.256*);	
Wrong	route	(.334**);	
Signal	faults	(.269*);	
Trainfault	ATP	(.301*);	
Trackfault	ATP	(.260*);	
Passenger	overcarried	(.526**);	
Overspeeding	 1-3,	6,	8	 12-5	pm	 None	 Passenger	entrapment	(.772*);	
Wrong	side	doors	(.453*);	
Doors	obstruction	(.472*);	
Category	A	SPaD	(.256*);	
Trackfault	ATP	(.307*);	
Failure	to	call	 2,	7-9	 1-2	pm	 Trackfault	ATP	(.600*);	
Dispatch	equipment	(.566*);	
None	 Station	overrun	(.282*);	
Station	overrun	 8-12	 8-9	am;	
11	am	–	12	pm	
Dispatch	equipment	(.666*);	
LRA	(.718*);	
Category	A	SPaD	(.498*);	
Foliage	fouls	(.580**);	
Failure	to	call	(.282*);	
Passenger	entrapment	(.273*);	
Foliage	fouls	(-.407**);	
Passenger	 8-11,	13	 12-3	pm;	
4-5	pm	
Doors	obstruction	(.578*);	
Dispatch	equipment	(.633*);	
Category	A	SPaD	(.574*);	
Overspeeding	(.772**);	
Station	overrun	(.273*);	
Doors	obstruction	(.280*);	
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entrapment	 Wrong	side	doors	(.696**);	
Doors	obstruction	(.606**)	
Foliage	fouls	(-.377**);	
LRA	(-.321*);	
Passenger	overcarried	(-.257*);	
Wrong	side	
doors		
6,	8-9,	11,	13	 1-3	pm;	
7-10	am;	
4-5	pm	
None	 Category	A	SPaDs	(.601**);	
Overspeeding	(.453*);	
Passenger	entrapment	(.696**);	
Foliage	fouls	(.606**);	
Trackfault	ATP	(.285*);	
Wrong	route	 6,	8,	10,	13	 6-10	am;	
5-8	pm	
Dispatch	equipment	(.579*);	 LRA	(.450*);	
Passenger	overcarried	(.441*);	
Category	A	SPaD	(.334**);	
Signal	faults	(.293*)	
Foliage	fouls	(.398**);	
LRA	(.261*);	
Passenger	overcarried	(.475**)	
Rjabovs	and	Palacin	
The	four	worst	performing	stations	for	selected	driver-related	incident	types	were	studied	in	depth.	The	
peak	of	the	overspeeding	at	these	locations	is	at	the	beginning	of	an	operating	year	(April	to	June),	and	
between	midday	and	 the	evening	peak.	Majority	of	 station	overruns	happen	during	 late	Autumn	and	
Winter	months,	but	such	incidents	are	relatively	evenly	distributed	throughout	a	day.		There	is	a	peak	in	
passenger	entrapment	incidents	around	January,	with	an	overall	trend	for	such	incidents	starting	from	
October	 onwards.	 In	 terms	 of	 times	 of	 a	 day,	 the	 12-3	 pm	 peak	 for	 passenger	 entrapments	 was	
discovered.	 Period	 6	 (Late	 August	 to	 mid-September)	 has	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 wrong	 side	 door	
activations,	with	the	second	half	of	an	operating	year	(October	onwards)	having	a	higher	frequency	of	
such	incidents.	Finally,	there	are	two	relatively	similar	rises	in	wrong	side	door	activations	–	around	the	
morning	peak,	and	between	1-3	pm.		
Associations	with	additional	indicators		
Table	6	below	displays	the	associations	found	between	the	additional	data	collected	and	driver-related	
incident	types.	Data	on	‘distance	between	stations’	and	‘schools	and	hospitals	nearby’	were	analysed	for	
correlations	 with	 driver-related	 incidents	 from	 the	 location-based	 data	 set.	 The	 remaining	 additional	
data	 was	 checked	 for	 associations	 with	 driver-related	 incidents	 from	 the	 time-based	 data	 set.	 The	
significance	of	the	correlation	coefficient	was	detected	as	similar	to	the	previous	section.		
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Table	6.	Associations	with	additional	data.	*	correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.05	level	(2-tailed);	
**correlation	is	significant	at	the	0.01	level	(2-tailed).	
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Category	A	SPaDs		 0.017	 0.008	 0.632**	 0.068	 0.535*	
Overspeeding	 -0.119	 -0.222	 0.528*	 0.304	 0.435*	
Overspeeding	(4	worst	performing)	 N/A	 N/A	 0.408	 0.292	 0.274	
Failure	to	call	 -0.111	 0.096	 0.115	 0.176	 -0.031	
Station	overrun	 0.094	 -0.026	 0.360	 0.191	 0.438*	
Station	overrun	(4	worst	performing)	 N/A	 N/A	 0.168	 0.016	 0.240	
Passenger	entrapment	 -0.224	 0.086	 0.594**	 0.086	 0.342	
Passenger	entrapment	(4	worst	performing)	 N/A	 N/A	 0.330	 -0.023	 0.116	
Wrong	side	doors	activations	 -0.213	 -0.195	 0.794**	 0.224	 0.580**	
Wrong	side	doors	activations	(4	worst	
performing)		
N/A	 N/A	 0.528*	 0.247	 0.414	
Wrong	route	 0.167	 0.166	 0.130	 0.012	 0.491*	
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Discussion	
The	year	on	year	increase	in	driver-related	incidents	is	relatively	small	compared	to	43%	rise	in	overall	
number	of	incidents	in	the	sample.	Such	rise	in	incident	reporting	without	a	considerable	rise	in	driver-
related	 incidents	suggests	 improvements	 in	 the	safety	culture	 (38)	as	well	as	positive	results	 from	the	
Metro	operator’s	effort	to	increase	driver	reporting	rates.	The	changes	in	composition	of	driver-related	
incidents	 (table	 4)	 allow	 tracking	 the	 operator’s	 initiatives	 to	 address	 wrong-side	 door	 operation	
problem	and	reporting	of	passenger	entrapments.	On	the	other	hand,	it	also	shows	lack	of	progress	with	
category	A	SPaDs,	overspeeding	and	wrong	route	incidents.				
The	 composition	 of	 driver-related	 incidents	 on	 the	 Metro	 (Table	 4)	 demonstrates	 that	 almost	 half	
happen	while	drivers	are	carrying	out	 their	 station	duties.	This	accounts	 for	 five	 times	more	 incidents	
than	 category	A	 SPaDs,	 despite	 a	 significant	 research	 focus	 on	 the	 latter	 incident	 type.	Overspeeding	
accounts	for	a	significant	proportion	of	the	incidents	and	requires	in-depth	analysis.		
The	 consistency	 analysis	 (Table	 3)	 confirmed	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 preliminary	 study,	 where	 the	
importance	of	 location-based	 factors	was	discovered.	Significant	 localisation	 to	certain	 stations	allows	
the	 study	 of	 each	 incident	 type	 and	 the	 drawing	 of	 hypotheses	 about	 elements	 of	 physical	 design	
contributing	 to	 driver	 performance	 there.	 The	 lack	 of	 year-on-year	 consistency	 for	 Category	 A	 SPaDs	
suggests	 the	 importance	 of	 individual	 driver	 factors.	 Better	 consistency	was	 expected	 from	 the	 date-
based	sample,	at	 least	 for	station	overrun	and	failure	to	call	 incidents,	as	 those	mostly	happen	during	
the	 low	 rail	 adhesion	 (LRA)	 season.	 Time-based	 factors	 are	 very	 variable,	 with	 many	 dependent	 on	
weather	conditions,	circadian	rhythms	of	a	driver	etc.	However,	the	consistency	of	station	duty	related	
incidents	suggests	the	effects	of	patronage	levels,	crowding	and	the	associated	passenger	disturbances.		
Proc	ImechE	Part	F:	J	Rail	and	Rapid	Transit	
	
Effects	of	approach	distances,	tunnel	exits	and	time	on	duty	
No	 associations	 were	 found	 between	 the	 approach	 distance	 and	 incident	 locations	 (table	 6).	 As	 the	
longest	 approach	 time	 in	 the	Metro	 is	 only	 two	and	 a	 half	minutes,	 it	 is	 possibly	 not	 long	 enough	 to	
induce	boredom	or	to	reduce	driver	vigilance.	However,	research	from	the	automotive	industry	shows	
that	 sensory	 deprivation	 starts	 to	 appear	 rapidly	 in	monotonous	 environments	 (35).	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 say	
what	constitutes	a	monotonous	environment	for	metro	drivers,	however	it	should	not	be	very	different	
from	 car	 drivers’	 outside	 environment	 in	 overground	 sections.	 Similarly,	 no	 associations	 were	 found	
with	the	number	of	schools	and	hospitals	nearby	(table	6),	supporting	previous	research,	by	RSSB		(39),	
that	found	no	difference	in	driver	detection	of	children,	compared	to	adults.	The	500m	radius	used	may	
be	not	representative	for	elderly	passengers,	as	0.5	km	is	a	long	distance	for	mobility	equipment	users.		
Exploring	incident	times,	association	with	the	number	of	of	trains	in	the	system	occurs	(table	6).	Clearly,	
more	trains	cause	more	signals	at	danger	and	 further	 risk	of	SPaDs.	Moreover,	additional	services	are	
provided	to	cope	with	peak	demand	and	increased	passenger	levels	which,	as	previously	discussed,	are	
important	factors	in	incident	propagation	at	stations.	However,	the	central	corridor	(the	busiest	part	of	
the	network	where	 two	 lines	merge)	has	almost	no	driver-related	 incidents,	proving	 the	 incidents	are	
not	caused	simply	by	the	number	of	trains.	Hence	it	 is	safe	to	say	that	number	of	trains	 in	the	system	
only	induces	existing	issues	of	driver	performance,	at	the	worst	performing	locations.	It	also	means	that	
focusing	on	 the	worst	 performing	 stations	 could	bring	 substantial	 safety	benefits.	Associations	with	 a	
driver’s	time	on	duty		(table	6)	suggests	that	2	hours	into	the	driving	portion	is	a	significantly	riskier	time	
than	the	start	of	a	shift,	which	supports	a	claim	of	the	overall	monotonousness	of	the	train	driving	task,	
in	the	Metro.	Furthermore,	it	was	discovered	that	locations	associated	with	tunnel	exits	or	entrances	do	
not	 provide	 any	 additional	 increase	 in	 alertness	 or	 arousal	 levels.	 Twenty-four	 such	 locations	 were	
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identified	and	explored,	demonstrating	10%	higher	 incident	 levels	 compared	 to	 the	 rest	of	 the	Metro	
network.	 This	 contradicts	 findings	 from	mainline	 railways	 (33)	 and	 road,	 but	 can	 be	 explained	by	 the	
specific	skill	and	mind	set	requirement	of	metro	drivers,	as	well	as	the	comparative	population	size.	This	
notion	of	 the	dip	 in	performance,	 if	 incorporated	 into	metro	driver	 training	and	rostering,	could	bring	
significant	safety	benefits.		
Metro	infrastructure	vs	Network	Rail	infrastructure	
The	 existence	 of	 the	 shared	 section	 between	 the	 Metro	 and	 NR	 allows	 for	 comparison	 of	 the	
infrastructure,	 using	 the	 incident	 statistics.	 First,	 the	 number	 of	 driver-related	 incidents	 on	 the	 NR	
infrastructure	is	7.5%	lower	than	on	the	Metro	infrastructure.	However,	there	are	75%	fewer	trains	on	
part	of	the	system,	compared	to	the	central	corridor,	thus	supporting	the	conclusion	that	the	number	of	
trains	 is	 not	 a	 causal	 factor	 in	 incident	 propagation.	 Secondly,	 one	 particular	 Type	 1	 station	
demonstrated	 several	 station	 overruns	 outside	 of	 the	 LRA	 season.	 This	 station	 deviates	 from	 the	
standard	 Type	 1	 design	 somewhat,	 as	 the	 running	 signals	 are	 located	 considerably	 further	 from	 the	
platform	edge	than	normal.	It	is	possible	that	the	Metro	drivers	use	a	running	signal	as	a	reference	point	
when	 selecting	 stopping	 position.	 Thirdly,	 only	 4.1%	 of	 the	 Category	 A	 SPaDs	 occurred	 at	 the	 NR	
infrastructure,	where	the	NR	four-aspect	signals	are	used,	even	though	this	part	of	the	Metro	accounts	
for	 12%	of	 the	 stations	 and	 19%	of	 track-kilometres.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 advance	warning	
provided	by	four-aspect	signalling	has	a	positive	effect	on	SPaD	statistics.	Furthermore,	this	part	of	the	
network	has	straighter	approaches	and	better	signal	sighting	distances,	although	it	is	more	vulnerable	to	
‘see	through’	SPaDs,	where	drivers	focus	on	the	more	distant	signal	instead	of	the	nearest	signal	down	
the	line.		
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Locations	deviating	from	standardised	design		
Despite	a	somewhat	standardised	Metro	station	design,	many	do	deviate	from	the	types	presented	 in	
figure	1.	The	four	worst	performing	stations	for	Category	A	SPaDs	all	have	elements	that	do	not	fit	any	
of	the	types.	Three	of	those	associate	with	sidings,	turnaround	facilities	and	subsequent	use	of	ground	
position	lights	(GPL).	Such	locations	are	used	for	short	peak	services,	when	drivers	are	mostly	pushed	to	
maintain	the	timetable.	However,	most	driver	duties	require	them	to	enter	the	sidings,	so	 it	would	be	
incorrect	to	blame	lack	of	experience	in	using	the	GPL;	it	simply	means	that	the	design	of	this	signalling	
type	has	serious	flaws	in	terms	of	usability.	Type	2	and	Type	3	line	terminus	stations	are	also	involved	in	
several	Category	A	SPaDs.	Due	to	a	layout	that	allows	trains	to	arrive	at	either	of	the	two	platforms,	the	
position	 of	 a	 running	 signal	 changes	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 driver’s	 cab.	 Hence,	 situational	 awareness	
becomes	 as	 important	 as	 route	 knowledge	 at	 these	 stations.	 Interestingly	 some	 stations,	 where	
simplification	of	the	standard	design	has	occurred,	demonstrate	no	incidents	in	the	two	operating	years,	
e.g.	one	Type	1	station	around	the	coast.	That	station	fits	Type	1	except	for	no	running	signals.		
Three	of	the	four	worst	performing	stations	for	passenger	entrapment	are	Type	3	underground	stations.	
This	 design	 type	 features	 monitors	 and	 platform	 cameras	 for	 the	 DOO.	 Moreover,	 drivers	 only	 see	
approaching	 passengers	 when	 they	 enter	 a	 platform	 from	 a	 station	 atrium,	 thus	 losing	 situational	
awareness	 of	 events	 outside	 the	 platform.	Moreover,	 passenger	 loading	 at	 such	 stations	 sometimes	
makes	 it	 hard	 to	 achieve	 a	 clear	 view	 of	 the	 doors,	 using	 the	 existing	 small	 monitors	 and	 only	 two	
platform	cameras.	Proximity	to	schools	was	deemed	an	important	causal	factor	for	incident	levels	at	the	
only	 Type	 1	 worst	 performing	 station	 for	 this	 incident	 type,	 but	 this	 was	 not	 confirmed.	 However,	
passenger	entrapments	there	happen	during	the	colder	Autumn-Winter	months,	hence	bulkier	clothing	
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could	be	a	causal	factor.	Furthermore,	some	drivers	believe	that	passengers	are	more	inclined	to	run	for	
the	doors	after	the	warning	tone,	when	it	is	cold,	thus	trapping	themselves.		
Even	though	wrong	route	 incidents	are	mostly	 localised	to	 terminus	stations,	some	have	happened	at	
other	 locations,	 predominantly	 Type	 1.	 All	 of	 those	 stations	 were	 used	 as	 turn-around	 points	 during	
engineering	works,	 in	 the	 period	 under	 investigation.	Moreover,	 period-based	 statistics	 supports	 this	
connection.	It	is	possible	to	claim	that	the	Metro	drivers	are	struggling	with	procedures	that	are	not	part	
of	 their	 day-to-day	 driving,	 especially	when	 using	 the	 stations	 from	 a	 different	 platform,	 or	 from	 the	
wrong	direction.		
Importance	of	platform	side	and	speed	limits	
Tyne	&	Wear	Metro	 includes	 stations	of	 various	 types	and	 there	are	parts	of	 the	network	where,	 for	
example,	 a	 train	 departs	 a	 Type	 1	 station	 and	 arrives	 at	 a	 Type	 2	 or	 3.	 This	 is	where	 a	 platform	 side	
change	occurs.	It	was	expected	that	these	locations	would	be	hotspots	for	wrong	side	door	activations,	
but	the	data	demonstrate	a	more	complex	scene.	Even	though	three	out	of	the	four	worst	performing	
stations	 are	 associated	 with	 platform	 change,	 more	 than	 40%	 of	 such	 incidents	 happened	 at	 other	
stations.	Moreover,	the	mean	for	wrong	side	door	activations	at	non	platform	change	locations	is	higher	
than	 at	 the	 expected	 locations.	 Interestingly,	 most	 of	 the	 wrong	 side	 door	 incidents	 at	 the	 worst	
performing	station	(Type	3	-	29%	of	all	wrong	side	door	activations	in	the	Metro)	happen	travelling	from	
the	 direction	 that	 does	 not	 involve	 platform	 side	 change.	 There	 was	 a	 69%	 drop	 in	 such	 incidents	
between	 2011/12	 and	 2012/13	 at	 this	 location.	 This	 decrease	 happened	 after	 the	 backlight	 for	 an	
advertising	 board,	 situated	 next	 to	 a	 cab	 stopping	 position,	was	 changed	 to	 a	 less	 bright	 one	 at	 that	
station.	Furthermore,	Type	2	and	Type	3	line	terminus	stations	have	the	same	arrangement,	with	trains	
arriving	 at	 either	 of	 the	 two	 platforms,	 yet	 Type	 2	 station	 had	 no	 incident	 with	 the	 door	 release.	 It	
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should	 however	 be	 noted	 that	 this	 particular	 Type	 2	 line	 terminus	 station	 is	 an	 overground	 station,	
whereas	the	Type	3	line	terminus	stations	is	located	underground.	The	importance	of	lighting	conditions	
is	further	suggested	by	the	fact	that	88.9%	of	Type	3	underground	stations	had	at	least	one	wrong	side	
door	activation.	Finally,	two	stations	deviating	from	the	standard	design	(Type	1	and	Type	2)	had	a	high	
number	of	such	incidents.	These	stations	have	running	signals	positioned	on	the	other	side	of	the	track	
from	 normal.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 drivers	 unconsciously	 select	 the	 set	 of	 doors	 to	 open,	 based	 on	 the	
position	of	a	 running	signal,	or	ambient	 lighting	conditions	 (platform	side	 is	always	brighter	at	Type	3	
stations).		
All	of	the	worst	performing	stations	for	overspeeding	 incidents	have	 low	speed	limits	 in	common.	The	
speed	 limit	 through	 these	 locations	 is	 between	 5	 and	 15	 kmph.	 The	 line	 terminus	 station,	 with	 the	
highest	number	of	 incidents	of	 this	 type,	 stands	out	 for	having	a	very	steep	drop,	 from	80	kmph	to	5	
kmph.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 claim	 that	 drivers	 struggle	 to	 maintain	 a	 low	 speed	 limit	 for	 long	 distances,	
especially	after	driving	at	the	maximum	speed.	This	was	also	confirmed	by	informal	conversations	with	
some	Metro	drivers.		
Associations	
Associations	 between	 the	 incident	 types	 mostly	 revealed	 the	 expected	 connections.	 For	 example,	
overspeeding	 and	 Category	 A	 SPaDs	 are	 typically	 in	 the	 same	 locations,	 as	 often	 the	 same	 trackside	
equipment	controls	both	train	speed	and	moving	authority.	Supporting	the	suggestion	of	cognitive	roots	
for	SPaDs	and	wrong	side	door	incidents	(40),	associations	were	found	between	these	two	types	and	the	
number	of	drivers	2	hours	into	the	driving	portion	of	their	shift.	Such	associations	prove	common	failure	
mechanisms	 and	 causal	 factors,	 for	 different	 incident	 types.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 most	
associations	were	 found	 in	 the	 location-based	data	sample,	even	though	the	coefficients	were	usually	
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higher	 in	 other	 samples.	 This	 shows	 the	 inter-dependability	 of	 different	 incident	 types,	 in	 terms	 of	
design-related	 factors,	 but	 raises	 a	 question	 about	 whether	 those	 factors	 are	 really	 influential	 or	
whether	there	is	simply	more	location-based	factors	involved	in	incident	propagation.		
Conclusions	
The	 paper	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 design-related	 factors	 in	 the	 propagation	 of	Metro	 incidents.	
Moreover,	 a	high	 level	of	 inter-dependence	between	causal	mechanisms	 is	 shown,	 for	 location-based	
factors.	High	priority	should	be	given	to	overspeeding	and	station-related	incidents,	as	these	constitute	
almost	70%	of	Metro	driver-related	incidents.	Although	the	features	of	a	metro	system	suggest	superior	
route	knowledge	and	increased	familiarity	of	drivers	with	the	system,	the	results	show	that	this	can	lead	
to	unsatisfactory	safety	performance,	during	non-routine	operations,	and	at	locations	where	situational	
awareness	might	 be	 limited.	 Other	 locations	 that	 require	 increased	 attention	 are	 those	 stations	 that	
deviate	from	the	standardised	design.	Several	elements	of	the	physical	environment	that	are	associated	
with	such	 locations	are	ground	position	 lights,	hidden	passenger	approaches,	change	of	platform	side,	
imposed	speed	limits	etc.	On	the	other	hand,	simplification	of	the	standardised	design	might	also	yield	
safety	benefits.	Infrastructure	used	by	Network	Rail	shows	fewer	adverse	effects	on	driver	performance	
than	the	Metro’s	own	infrastructure.		
Drivers	were	found	to	lose	their	alertness	and	high	performance	levels	approximately	two	hours	into	the	
driving	 portion	 of	 a	 shift.	 This	 finding,	 when	 used	 for	 rostering,	 could	 improve	 Metro’s	 safety	
performance	even	 further.	Even	 though	 the	number	of	 trains	passing	 through	a	 station	 is	not	directly	
related	to	the	number	of	incidents	at	that	location,	it	can	induce	incident	propagation	in	the	problematic	
parts	of	the	network.	Environmental	and	personal	factors	should	not	be	disregarded	in	further	studies,	
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especially	 for	 Category	 A	 SPaDs	 and	 passenger	 entrapments.	 Similarly,	 passenger	 loading	 shows	 an	
important	contribution	to	incident	causality.		
List	of	abbreviations	
HF(s)	 Human	Factor(s)	
PSF(s)	 Performance	Shaping	Factor(s)	
SPaD	 Signal	Passed	at	Danger	
RSSB	 Rail	Safety	and	Standards	Board	
ATP	 Automatic	Train	Protection	
AWS	 Automatic	Warning	System	
CCTV	 Closed	Circuit	Television	
PTI	 Platform-Train	Interface	
DOO	 Driver-Only	Operation	
LRA	 Low	Rail	Adhesion	
T&W		 Tyne	&	Wear	
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